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LIEN AVOIDANCE UNDER SECTION 522(f)
OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE:
IS RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION
CONSTITUTIONAL?
INTRODUCTION
Section 522(f)' of Title I (the Code) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 (the Act)2 grants debtors 3 the power to avoid' judicial liens'
1. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (Supp. 11 1978). "Notwithstanding any waiver of exemp-
tions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien ... that... impairs an exemption to
which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if
such lien is-(1) a judicial lien; or (2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security
interest in any-(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, ap-
pliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held pri-
marily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor; (B) implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or the
trade of a dependent of the debtor; or (C) professionally prescribed health aids for
the debtor or a dependent of the debtor." Id. "'[L]ien' means charge against or
interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation."
Id. § 101(28).
2. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). The Bankruptcy Reform Act con-
sists of four titles. Title I contains the substantive bankruptcy law. 92 Stat. 2549-657
(codified at 11 U.S.C. 88 101-151326 (Supp. 11 1978)). Title II creates a new bank-
ruptcy judicial system. 92 Stat. 2657-73 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.
(Supp. II 1978)). Title III amends various other statutes. 92 Stat. 2673-82 (codified in
scattered sections throughout the U.S.C. (Supp. 11 1978)). Title IN' provides for the
transition between the old and new laws. 92 Stat. 2682-88. As of this writing, the
proposed Technical Amendments to the Bankruptcy Reform Act, S. 658, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979), 125 Cong. Rec. S12172 (daily ed. Sept. 7. 1979) (as amended), was
still under consideration in Congress. The latest amended version of S. 658 does not
substantively change § 522(f). See id. § 37(f), 126 Cong. Rec. H 11729 (daily ed. Dec.
3, 1980).
3. For purposes of the Code, "debtor" means the person or municipality for
whom bankruptcy relief is at issue. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (Supp. 11 1978). This broad
definition of "debtor," which includes businesses that are liquidating or reorganizing,
eased various drafting problems. S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Report], reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 5787, 5809; H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 310 (1977) (hereinafter
cited as House Report], reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5963,
6267. The Code does not use the term "bankrupt." The use of "debtor" was felt to
carry less of a stigma. House Report, supra, at 310, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 6267.
4. The power of avoidance in § 522(f) requires the debtor to take "some affirma-
tive action" to enjoy the benefits of the section, "rather than [voiding the] liens ...
automatically... by operation of law." Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on
S. 2266 and H.R. 8200 before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 687 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as 1977 Senate Hearings] (statement of Hon. Joe Lee). The trustee and the
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and certain nonpossessory non-purchase money security interests" to
the extent that the liens encumber the debtor's interest in assets
otherwise exempt from creditors' claims.' The section only applies to
debtor also share other powers of avoidance beyond the scope of this Note. See 11
U.S.C. § 522(h) (Supp. II 1978) (debtor can avoid certain liens, preferences, and
fraudulent conveyances to the extent a trustee does not attempt to avoid and an
exemption could be claimed).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (Supp. II 1978). The Code defines "judicial lien" as a
"lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process
or proceeding." Id. § 101(27).
6. Id. § 522(f)(2). The Code defines "security interest" as a "lien created by an
agreement." Id. § 101(37). This definition is broader than that of the U.C.C, because
it is not limited to realty. Compare id. with U.C.C. §§ 9-102(I)(a),-104 (j). "A secur-
ity interest is not enforceable" unless the secured party possesses the collateral, or
the debtor has signed a security agreement, U.C.C. § 9-203(1), and only security
interests that are perfected by security agreements, as opposed to possession, are
subject to avoidance by the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f),2) (Supp. 11 1978). Both the
Code and the U.C.C. define a "security agreement" as an agreement that "creates or
provides for a security interest." Id. § 101(36); U.C.C. § 9-105 (1)(). The Code does
not provide a definition for "purchase-money security interest." See Report of the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doe. No. 93-137,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 180 n.36 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Commission Report], re-
printed in App. 2 Collier on Bankruptcy 180 n.36 (15th ed. L. King 1980). The
U.C.C. defines purchase money security interests as those securing an obligation
that financed the acquisition of the collateral, whether taken by the seller or a third
party. U.C.C. § 9-105. Collateral is the property encumbered by the security in-
terest. Id. § 9-105(1)(c). Purchase money security interests are excluded from the
debtor's avoidance powers. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
7. The debtor's interests in assets are made exempt by exclusion in court from
the bankruptcy estate, which is used to satisfy creditors' general, or unsecured,
claims. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b)(), 541 (Supp. I 1978). Section 522(f)(1) permits the
avoidance of judicial liens on any exempt assets to the extent of the exemption the
debtor could otherwise claim. Id. § 522(f)(1). Federal exemptions include a $7,500
interest in the debtor's residence, a $1,200 interest in a motor vehicle, $200 of family
and household personality, $750 of professional items, certain life insurance pro-
ceeds, health aids, and other incidental items. Id. § 522(d). Section 522(f)(2) is more
limited. Both possessory and purchase money security interests are excluded, and
the creditor's lien is only subject to avoidance if it encumbers certain household,
professional, or health items. See note 1 supra. The Code permits debtors to choose,
and states to require, the use of state, rather than federal, exemptions. 11 U.S.C. §
522(b) (Supp. 11 1978). In such a case, state exemptions would apply under § 522(f).
See 124 Cong. Rec. S17406 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Wallop). State
exemptions vary widely. For example, while exemptions in Connecticut and Mary-
land are mostly limited to necessary personality, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-352b
(West Supp. 1980); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 11-504 (Supp. 1980), South
Dakota grants an absolute exemption on the homestead and a $30,000 exemption on
proceeds derived from its sale. S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 43-45-3 (Supp. 1980). Both
New York and Texas exempt $10,000 of the debtor's interest in an urban residence.
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 5206(a)1-3 (McKinney Supp. 1980); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
art. 3833(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980). Although New York exempts only certain neces-
sary personal assets, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 5205 (McKinney Supp. 1980), Texas
gives families a blanket 830,000 exemption on a variety of personal items. Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3836 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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individuals 6 and may be invoked in debt reorganizations, income
recipient proceedings, and liquidations.' The exemption provisions
allow a debtor to retain a limited interest in his residence, clothes,
professional tools, health aids, and household furniture after a dis-
charge in bankruptcy. 10  The debtor is given "a new opportunity' in
life and a clear field for future effort"" or, more succinctly, a fresh
start.
This fresh start was not assured under the old bankruptcy law.
Although non-business bankruptcies now comprise over eighty per
cent of the number filed each year," until 1978, bankruptcy law
emphasized business bankruptcies.' This emphasis allowed over-
8. Exemption provisions in the Code are only available to individual debtors. 11
U.S.C. § 522(b) (Supp. 111 978).
9. Except for certain provisions involving railroad reorganizations, "chapters 1, 3
and 5 of [the Code] apply in a case under chapter 7, 11 or 13." Id. § 103. Section
522(f) is contained in chapter 5, Which deals with creditors and their claims, the
debtor's duties and benefits, and the estate. Debt reorganization is covered by chap-
ter 11, id. §§ 1101-1174, income recipient proceedings by chapter 13, id. §§ 1301-
1330, and liquidations by chapter 7. Id. §§ 701-766.
10. See id. § 522.
11. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234. 244 11934). accord, Lines v.
Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970) (per curiam).
12. [1977] Dir. Admin. Office U.S. Courts Ann. Rep. 131; see H.R. Rep. No.
927, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 [hereinafter cited as 1970 House Report], reprinted in
[1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3559, 3560; Apilado, Dauten & Smith, Per-
sonal Bankruptcies, 7 J. Legal Stud. 371, 371-72 (1978); Countryman, Consuners in
Bankruptcy Cases, 18 Washburn L.J. 1, 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Countryman
I]. The number of non-business bankruptcies has increased dramatically since World
War II. See House Report, supra note 3, at 116, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 6076; Commission Report, supra note 6, at 33-59, reprinted in
App. 2 Collier on Bankruptcy 33-59 (15th ed. L. King 1980); D. Stanley & M. Girth,
Bankruptcy: Problem, Process, Reform 2 (1971) (Brookings Institution study). Apil-
ado, Dauten & Smith, supra, at 371-72; Countryman 1, supra. at 1. Comment, Pro-
tection of a Debtor's "Fresh Start" under the New Bankruptcy Code, 29 Cath. U.L.
Rev. 843, 844 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Fresh Start]. The percentage of bankrupt-
cies attributable to consumers did drop somewhat during the last decade. See [1977]
Dir. Admin. Office U.S. Courts Ann. Rep. 131. The percentage of consumer bank-
ruptcies has increased in 1980, however, due to the Code's favorable treatment of
consumer debtors. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1980, § D, at 2, col. 1, id., Apr. 20, 1980, §
3, at 23, col. 1.
13. House Report, supra note 3, at 2, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 5966 ("The second major problem under current bankruptcy law is the
inadequacy of relief that the Bankruptcy Act provides for consumer debtors."); id. at
116-17, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6076; 1970 House
Report, supra note 12, at 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
3559; Anderson, Debtor and Creditor Consumers and the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 2
W. New Eng. L. Rev. 5, 6 (1979); Pickard, The New Bankruptcy Code, Part 1: A
Review of Some of the Significant Changes in Bankruptcy Law, 10 Mern. St. L. Rev.
177, 182 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Pickard I]; Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: A Full
Circle Bank to the Act of 1800?, 53 Cornell L. Rev. 663, 663 (1968).
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reaching creditors to obtain blanket security interests on all of the
debtor's assets, waivers of statutory exemptions from attachment to
satisfy debts, and other one-sided provisions, through contracts of
adhesion. 4 These provisions enabled creditors to obtain enforceable
liens on the debtor's theoretically exempt assets and coerce repay-
ment by threatening to repossess the assets that, though often of lim-
ited resale value to the creditor, would be expensive for the debtor to
replace." Because exemptions were defined by state law' 6 and were
excluded ab initio from the bankruptcy estate, 7 federal bankruptcy
14. See House Report, supra note 3, at 126-27, reprinted in [1968 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 6087-88; Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and
H.R. 32 before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 760-65 (1975-76) [hereinafter
cited as House Hearingy] (statement of David Williams); id. at 939-40, 946 (statement
of Ernest Sarason, Jr.); Commission Report, supra note 6, at 169, 173; Currie, Ex-
empt Property and Bankruptcy: Secured and Waiver Claims, 31 La. L. Rev. 73
(1970); Neustadter, Consumer Insolvency Counseling for Californians in the 1980s,
19 Santa Clara L. Rev. 817, 870-71 (1979); Pickard, The New Bankruptcy Code, Part
1I: The Interests of Secured Creditors under the New Bankruptcy Code, 10 Mem.
St. L. Rev. 215, 227 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Pickard II]; Vukowich, The Bank-
ruptcy Commission's Proposal Regarding Bankrupts' Exemption Rights, 63 Cal. L.
Rev. 1439, 1468 (1975); Fresh Start, supra note 12, at 860; Note, Bankruptcy Ex-
emptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 Yale L.J. 1459, 1470, 1494-97 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Exemptions Critique].
15. House Hearings, supra note 14, at 760, 762 (statement of David Williams)
(summarizing findings of an investigation of 130 consumer finance company offices).
"The consumer who applies for credit also signs a form instrument which is prepared
by the legal department of the firm he deals with. This instrument asserts every
right, waiver, and remedy which local law permits or tolerates .... To a varying
extent, the typical consumer credit contract contains, an assignment of future wages,
a blanket security interest in all of the household property owned or held by the
consumer and his family, a waiver of statutory exemptions, a waiver of the right of
notice upon default and damages upon tortious repossession of collateral, liquidated
damages for late or extended payments, a provision imposing attorney's fees in the
event of a default whether or not suit is filed, and, in those few jurisdictions which
still permit the practice, a confession of judgment .... The blanket security interest
in household goods, combined with the related boilerplate waiver of statutory ex-
emptions has at least three uses. It is an effective lever for securing refinancings
[against the debtor's best interests] at appropriate stages of the collection cycle. It is
used occasionally for limited economic recovery by actual seizure of the property.
Finally, a blanket lien on household goods is among the most effective levers avail-
able for securing an anticipatory reaffirmation of a debt which is otherwise discharge-
able in bankruptcy .... We believe that the documented lack of economic value for
certain household necessities makes them a special case for the purpose of your
deliberations." Id.
16. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 548 (1897-99), as amended by Chand-
ler Act, ch. 575, § 6, 52 Stat. 847 (originally codified at 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976)
(replaced by 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1978)).
17. The debtor's property was transferred to the bankruptcy estate "except in so
far as it [was] exempt." Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, § 70(a), 30 Stat. 565 (1897-99)
(originally codified at [l U.S.C. § 110(a) (1976) (replaced by 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)
(Supp. 11 1978))).
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courts did not have jurisdiction to resolve disputes concerning
exempt assets." Under the old law, if a state court upheld a lien
obtained on assets that would otherwise be exempt, repossession
could leave the debtor without assets for a fresh start.'"
Congress enacted several measures, including section 522(f), in the
new Code to assure that starting afresh meant more for bankrupt in-
dividuals than becoming destitute."° Exempt property now is in-
cluded ab initio in the estate -' and usually protected from antecedent
claims once exempted.! Waivers of exemptions executed for unse-
cured creditors are no longer enforceable." Although valid liens on
assets worth more than the amount of the applicable exemption 2' sur-
vive the discharge,5 the potential for abuse has been reduced by sec-
18. Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1903). Assets were
vulnerable to claims by repossession or judicial proceeding. See IA Collier on Bank-
ruptcy 6.05[1]-[3] (14th ed. J. Moore 1978); Countryman, For a New Exemption
Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 Rutgers L. Rev. 678, 709-13 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
Countryman II]; Currie, supra note 14; Kennedy, Limitations on Exemptions in
Bankruptcy, 45 Iowa L. Rev. 445, 462-69 (1960); Exemptions Critique. supra note
14, at 1475-78, 1494-97. The House report speaks of § 522(f)(1) as providing a means
to protect the debtor from "a creditor [who] beats the debtor into court." House
Report, supra note 3, at 126-27, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
at 6087. Thus, creditors may not enforce the waiver of exemptions with a judicial lien
obtained in a state court. H. Miller & M. Cook, A Practical Guide to the Bankruptcy
Reform Act 190 (1979); see Countryman II, supra, at 708-32; Kennedy, supra, at
449-53, 462-69; Vukowich, supra note 14, at 1469; Exemptions Critique, supra note
14, at 1470.
19. See Countryman II, supra note 18, at 681-84; Kennedy, supra note 18, at
462-69; Exemptions Critique, supra note 14, at 1469-70, 1494-97.
20. House Report, supra note 3, at 4, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 5966; see Senate Report, supra note 3, at 1-6. reprinted in [1978] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 87-92; House Report, supra note 3, at 4. 117-18, re-
printed in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5966, 6077-78. 123 Cong. Rev.
H11698-99 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); House Hearings,
supra note 14, at 938 (statement of Ernest Sarason, Jr.); id. at 979 (statement of
Hon. Clive Bare); id. at 1006 (testimony of Hon. Clive Bare); id. at 1284 (statement
of Hon. Joe Lee); cf. House Hearings, supra note 14, at 1256 (statement of Robert
Ward) (§ 522(f) may harm the availability of credit to consumer).
21. "The commencement of a case . . . creates an estate ... comprised of ...
all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of
the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1978). This provision altered the rule of
Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294 (1903), under which exemptions were
beyond the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 82,
reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6324; House Report, supra note
3, at 368, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6324.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (Supp. 11 1978).
23. Id. § 522(e).
24. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
25. Liens subject to avoidance under § 522(f) are excepted from the continuing
protection of § 522(c). 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2) (Supp. 11 1978). This provision is in-
1981]
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tion 522(f) avoidance provisions' and the debtor's right in a liquida-
tion to redeem at current value certain exempt personal assets.,, In
addition, Congress permitted the reaffirmation of non-business debt
only after scrutiny by the bankruptcy court.' Thus, section 522(f) is
part of a congressional scheme to enhance an individual debtor's fresh
start by protecting exemptions and reducing the likelihood of coerced
reaffirmation.
This change, however, raises various constitutional problems. Be-
cause a creditor's rights vary depending on whether the new or old
law applies, creditors have challenged the section in cases brought
after the effective date of the Code. The bankruptcy courts, in re-
sponse, have split on whether the section is constitutional when ap-
plied retrospectively 9 to liens created prior to the Code's
tended to continue the rule of Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886), that valid liens
on exempt property are enforceable. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 76, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5862; House Report, supra note 3, at 361,
reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6317. Of course, "to the extent
that [a] lien impairs an exemption," it does not survive if it is one that may be
avoided under § 522(f). 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (Supp. 11 1978).
26. See notes 1-7 supra and accompanying text. If the debtor chooses federal
exemptions when they are more liberal than those under state law, § 522(f)(1) will
protect the debtor from judgments in state court obtained against federally exempt
assets. But see note 7 supra (states may prohibit use of federal exemptions).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 722 (Supp. 11 1978). Section 722 applies only to the extent that
the lien exceeds the ecemption amount, and protects liens on consumer goods and
abandoned property. Id.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c), (d) (Supp. 11 1978). This provision was debated intensely.
See, e.g., 124 Cong. Rec. S14719 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Wallop)
(prohibiting reaffirmation "is a mistake"); 124 Cong. Rec. S14743 (daily ed. Sept. 7,
1978) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("efforts by lending firms to reinstate their power
to have new life breathed into discharged debts are, to me, unconscionable").
29. "Retrospective" is used in this Note to mean the effect legislation has when it
diminishes rights or increases obligations established prior to the legislation's enact-
ment or effective date. The term "retroactive" will mean the effect legislation has
when it takes effect on a date prior to the legislation's enactment or is directed at
past events. Using these definitions, § 522(f) could be retrospective, but not retroac-
tive, because the Code was not effective before enactment, and is applied only when
the bankruptcy petition is filed. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301-306 (Supp. 11 1978). Although
distinguishing retrospective from retroactive may clarify the ways statutes alter ex-
isting rights, it is not done by courts. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Consti-
tutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 692 & n. 1 (1960); Smith,
Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 Tex. L. Rev. 229, 232-33 (1927) [hereinafter
cited as Smith I]. As a recent example of this failure to distinguish, see Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), in which the Court engages in a
constitutional analysis of the retrospective effect of a statute, id. at 14-17 (emphasis
added), but later refers to that analysis as a "discussion of retroactivity." Id. at 24
(emphasis added). Nonetheless, similar distinctions have been drawn by commenta-
tors. See Hochman, supra, at 692; Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Consid-
erations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 216, 217-18 (1960); Smead, The
Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 Minn. L.
Rev. 775, 781-83 (1936); cf. Smith I, supra, at 233 (every law "extinguishes rights
acquired under previously existing laws").
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enactment3° or effective date." This Note discusses whether section
522(f) should be construed to apply retrospectively" and whether ret-
trospective application is an unconstitutional infringement on the
rights of lienors.33 This Note argues that retrospective application is
30. The Code was enacted on November 6, 1978, Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, and holders of liens created prior to that
date have challenged § 552(f). E.g., Fisher v. Liberty Loan Corp., 6 Bankr. Rep.
(West) 206, 211-14 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980) (upheld); Curry v. Associates Fin'l
Servs., 5 Bankr. Rep. (West) 282, 290-91 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980) (upheld). Pierce
v. Oklahoma Health Servs. Fed. Credit Union, 4 Bankr. Rep. (West) 671, 672-74
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1980) (invalidated); Centran Bank v. Ambrose, 4 Bankr. Rep.
(West) 395, 400-01 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980) (upheld); Jackson v. Security Indus.
Bank, 4 Bankr. Rep. (West) 293, 296-98 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980) (invalidated). Hawley
v. Avco Fin'l Servs., Inc., 4 Bankr. Rep. (West) 147, 149-50 (Bankr. D. Cr. 1980)
(invalidated); Rutherford v. Associates Fin'l Servs. Co., 4 Bankr. Rep. (West) 510,
511-13 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980) (upheld); Hoops v. Freedom Fin. & See. Indus.
Bank, 3 Bankr. Rep. (West) 635, 63740 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980) (invalidated); Rod-
rock v. Security Indus. Bank, 3 Bankr. Rep. (West) 629, 631-33 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1980) (invalidated).
31. For most provisions, including § 522, the Code's effective date was October
1, 1979. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(a), 92 Stat.
2682. Fewer cases have invalidated retrospective application to liens created during
the period between enactment and effectiveness because the creditor has had notice
of the new law. E.g., Dotson v. Bradford, No. R-80-124, slip op. at 5-6 (D. Nev.
Sept. 26, 1980) (upheld); In re Primm, 6 Bankr. Rep. (Vest) 142, 14647 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1980) (upheld); Pockat v. Thorp Fin. Corp., 6 Bankr. Rep. (West) 24, 25
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1980) (upheld); Baker v. GFC Corp., 5 Bankr. Rep. (West) 397,
399-401 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980) (upheld); In re Beck, 4 Bankr. Rep. (West) 661,
664 (Bankr. C.D. II1. 1980) (upheld); U.S. Life Credit Corp. v. Steinart, 4 Bankr.
Rep. (West) 354, 358 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1980) (upheld). But see Lucero v. Security
Indus. Bank, 4 Bankr. Rep. (West) 659, 660 n.2, 661 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980) (invali-
dated after parties stipulated that judicial lien is a property right). Because this
notice argument weakens any challenge to retrospective application, this Note wvill
focus on liens created prior to enactment.
32. E.g., Dotson v. Bradford, No. R-80-124, slip op. at 3-6 (D. Nev. Sept. 26,
1980) (retrospective application construed); Fisher v. Liberty Loan Corp., 6 Bankr.
Rep. (West) 206, 211 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980) (retrospective application construed).
Curry v. Associates Fin. Servs., 5 Bankr. Rep. (West) 282, 288-93 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1980) (retrospective application construed); Pierce v. Oklahoma Health Servs.
Fed. Credit Union, 4 Bankr. Rep. (West) 671, 672-74 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1980)
(retrospective application not construed after finding of unconstitutionality). Centran
Bank v. Ambrose, 4 Bankr. Rep. (Vest) 395, 398-99 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980) (re-
trospective application construed); Head v. Home Credit Co., 4 Bankr. Rep. (West)
521, 524 (Bankr. D. Tenn. 1980) (retrospective application construed). U.S. Life
Credit Corp. v. Steinart, 4 Bankr. Rep. (West) 354, 358 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1980) (re-
trospective application construed); Jackson v. Security Indus. Bank, 4 Bankr. Rep.
(West) 293, 295 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980) (retrospective application construed); Hawley
v. Avco Fin'l Servs., 4 Bankr. Rep. (West) 147, 149 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980) (retrospec-
tive application denied after finding unconstitutional); Hoops v. Freedom Fin., 3 Bankr.
Rep. (West) 635, 637 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980) (retrospective application construed);
Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 3 Bankr. Rep. (West) 629, 634 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1980) (retrospective application construed).
33. E.g., Fisher v. Liberty Loan Corp., 6 Bankr. Rep. (West) 206. 211-14
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980) (upheld); In re Primm, 6 Bankr. Rep. (Vest) 142, 146-47
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appropriate as a matter of statutory construction, and is not unconsti-
tutional as an unjust taking or as a violation of substantive due pro-
cess.
I. RETROSPECTIVE CONSTRUCTION
Before addressing the constitutional limits on congressional power
to affect pre-existing liens with new bankruptcy legislation, it must
first be established, as a matter of statutory construction, that Con-
gress has exercised the bankruptcy power retrospectively. Because
section 522(f) interferes with the rights of lienors whose interests are
subject to avoidance provisions,' retrospective construction is disfa-
vored unless the Act's language, or congressional intent, clearly re-
quire retrospective application.'
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1980) (upheld); Pockat v. Thorp Fin. Corp., 6 Bankr. Rep, (West)
24, 25 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1980) (upheld); Baker v. GFC Corp., 5 Bankr. Rep,
(West) 397, 399-400 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980) (upheld); Curry v. Associates Fin'l
Servs., 5 Bankr. Rep. (West) 282, 290-91 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980) (upheld); Pierce
v. Oklahoma Health Servs. Fed. Credit Union, 4 Bankr. Rep. (West) 671, 674
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1980) (would be unconstitutional if retrospectively applied); In re
Beck, 4 Bankr. Rep. (West) 661, 664 (Bankr. C.D. III. 1980) (upheld); Centran Bank
v. Ambrose, 4 Bankr. Rep. (West) 395, 400-01 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980) (upheld);
Jackson v. Security Indus. Bank, 4 Bankr. Rep. (West) 293, 296-98 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1980) (unconstitutional); Hawley v. Avco Fin'l Servs., 4 Bankr. Rep. (West) 147,
149-50 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980) (unconstitutional if applied retrospectively); Rutherford
v. Associates Fin'l Servs., 4 Bankr. Rep. (West) 510, 511-13 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980)
(upheld); Hoops v. Freedom Fin. & Sec. Bank, 3 Bankr. Rep. (West) 635, 637-40
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1980) (unconstitutional); Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank., 3 Bankr.
Rep. (West) 629, 631-33 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980) (unconstitutional).
34. See notes 1, 7 supra and accompanying text.
35. The well-established rule of construction is that a statute interfering with
property rights should not be applied retrospectively unless the statute's language is
"clear, strong, and imperative, . . . or ... the intention of the legislature cannot
otherwise be satisfied." United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. 398, 412, 3 Cranch 399, 413
(1806) (Paterson, J.) (collector's commission); accord, Greene v. United States, 376
U.S. 149, 160 (1964) (right to back pay based on prior judgment); Union P.R.R. v.
Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913) (railroad right of way); United
States Fidelty & Guar. Co. v. United States ex rel. Struthers Wells Co., 209 U.S,
306, 314 (1908) (materialman's bond); see, e.g., Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 637, 639-40
(1914) (sales contract security interest); Sikora v. American Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116,
1121-22 (3d Cir. 1980) (existing retirement plan); National Consumer Information
Center v. Gallegos, 549 F.2d 822, 826-27 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (funding by federal gov-
ernment); cf. Bradley v. School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 711, 715, 720 (1974) (obligation
to pay attorney's fee in desegregation case does not infringe on a matured right);
Koger v. Ball, 497 F.2d 702, 706 (4th Cir. 1974) (no "right" to discriminate against
employees on basis of race). This rule has been applied by bankruptcy courts con-
struing § 522(f). See, e.g., Fisher v. Liberty Loan Corp., 6 Bankr. Rep. (West) 206,
211 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980); U.S. Life Credit Corp. v. Steinart, 4 Bankr. Rep.
(West) 354, 358 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1980); Head v. Homes Credit Co., 4 Bankr. Rep.
(West) 521, 524 (Bankr. D. Tenn. 1980); Jackson v. Security Indus. Bank, 4 Bankr.
Rep. (West) 293, 295 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
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The language of the Act supports retrospective application of sec-
tion 522(f). The Act took effect, and the prior federal bankruptcy law
was repealed, "on October 1, 1979"; ' exceptions to application of the
new Code are express. ' One exception, the savings clause, provides
that "the substantive rights of parties" are to be determined under
the old law in cases commenced under the old law." Because no
similar exception applies to cases arising after the effective date, the
new substantive rules should apply even to liens created prior to the
effective date.39 This interpretation is consistent with that of other
bankniptcy statutes construed to be retrospective."9
The legislative history of the Act, however, arguably supports the
conclusion that retrospective application was not intended. Prelimi-
nary drafts of the savings clause prepared by the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Law of the United States" and the National Conference
of Bankruptcy Judges 2 expressly required retrospective application.'
36. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(a), 92 Stat. 2652.
Certain amendments to scattered sections of the United States Code are made effec-
tive on other dates. Id. § 402(b)-(e), 92 Stat. 2682.
37. The effective date of October 1, 1979 governs "[e]xcept as otherwise pro-
vided" in Title IV. Id. § 402(a), 92 Stat. 2682.
38. Id. § 403(a), 92 Stat. 2683.
39. The repeal of a statute destroys its future effectiveness except as to proceed-
ings already closed or as provided in savings clauses. IA C. Sands, Sutherland's
Statutes and Statutory Construction §§ 23.33, 23.39 (4th ed. 1972).
40. Dickinson Indus. Site, Inc. v. Cowan, 309 U.S. 382, 383 (1940) (construing
Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 6, 52 Stat. 840, 940 (1938) (repealed 1979) (replaced by
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (Title I codified
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (Supp. 11 1978))); New York Credit Men's Adjustment
Bureau, Inc. v. A. Jesse Goldstein & Co., 276 F.2d 886, 888-89 (2d Cir. 1960)
(construing similar language); Coin Machine Acceptance Corp. v. O'Donnell, 192
F.2d 773, 777-78 (4th Cir. 1951) (construing similar language). In re Old Algiers,
Inc., 100 F.2d 374, 375 (2d Cir. 1938) (construing similar language), see Plumb, The
Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws-Exempt and In-
mune Property, 61 Va. L. Rev. 1, 138 & n.803 (1975). But see Holt v. Henley, 232
U.S. 637, 639-40 (1914) (act construed as prospective, but without analysis); Ginsberg
v. Lindel, 107 F.2d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 1939) (retrospective construction rejected
when retrospectivity made the act unconstitutional); Miles Corp. v. Lindel, 107 F.2d
729, 732 (8th Cir. 1939) (same).
41. H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in House Hearings, supra
note 14, app. at 2. The same bill was introduced in the Senate as S. 236, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28
DePaul L. Rev. 941, 944 & n.29 (1979); see 121 Cong. Rec. 641 (1975) (introduced
by Sen. Burdick).
42. H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in House Hearings, supra
note 14, app. at 2. The same bill was introduced in the Senate as S. 235, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Klee, supra note 41, at 943-44 & n.30; see 121 Cong. Rec.
641 (1975) (introduced by Sen. Burdick).
43. H.R. 31, 94th Cong., ist Sess., § 10-103 (a) (1975), reprinted in House Hear-
ings, supra note 14, app., at 320-21 (the new bankruptcy law "shall apply in all cases
or proceedings instituted after its effective date, regardless of the date of occurrence
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During the House hearings in 1976, however, a consultant to the
bankruptcy commission suggested certain exceptions to retrospective
application or a "separability clause" to avoid and lessen the impact of
constitutional challenges to the Act.Y Although the consultant raised
no significant constitutional argument against retrospective application
of federal exemptions,4 it could be argued that Congress did not in-
tend retrospective application because the express language in the
savings clause requiring retrospectivity was dropped, 6 and a separ-
ability clause was not inserted. 47
This argument fails to consider other indications of congressional
intent concerning retrospective application. First, numerous substan-
tive and editing changes were made by the congressional staff, in-
cluding the collection of all transition provisions in a separate title.",
The express language of the preliminary drafts may have been altered
in the pursuit of clarity, brevity, and organization, rather than de-
leted to demonstrate intent. 49  Second, many constitutional problems
concerning the retrospectivity of particular provisions were addressed
by rewriting those provisions 5 and by evincing intent favoring
of any of the operative facts determining legal rights, duties, or liabilities
hereunder"); H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 11-103(a) (1975), reprinted in House
Hearings, supra note 11, app., at 320-21 (same).
44. House Hearings, supra note 14, at 2034, 2066-67 (statement of William
Plumb, Jr.); The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 806, 837-38 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Senate
Hearings] (same).
45. House Hearings, supra note 14, at 2066 (statement of William Plumb, Jr.);
1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 44, at 837 (same).
46. The same provision of the Bankruptcy Reform Act only refers to the substan-
tive rights of parties whose cases are commenced under the old Act. Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 403(a), 92 Stat. 2683. The deletion during
drafting of a retroactive provision can be evidence of intended prospective applica-
tion if no other indicia of legislative intent are present. See Bradley v. School Bd.,
416 U.S. 696, 716 n.23 (1974); Yakim v. Califano, 587 F.2d 149, 150 (3d Cir. 1978).
47. 1 Collier on Bankruptcy 7.12 (15th ed. L. King 1980).
48. See Klee, supra note 41, at 945. Compare H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§
11-101 to -104 (1975), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 14, app., at 320-25
with Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, title IV, 92 Stat. 2682
(1978).
49. Congress worked on the proposed legislation fbr two years, during which
time countless drafting changes were made. See Klee, supra note 41, at 945-57.
Given the complexity and duration of the drafting process, the elimination of lan-
guage from an early draft hardly supports a conclusive inference of legislative intent.
See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
50. The consultant expressed concern over § 4-405(b), which eliminated state rec-
ognized priorities in marital property interests for creditors. House Hearings, supra
note 14, app., at 140 (congressional staff comments). Priorities are treated quite dif-
ferently, however, in the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (Supp. II 1978). Another provi-
sion in the commission's bill of concern to the consultant, § 4-601(a)(5)(A), included
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separability." Because a congressional choice to address a matter in
one part of a statute and not another is presumed to be intentional,
the alteration of some substantive provisions precludes the inference
of a general prohibition against retrospectivity. Third, even after de-
letion of the express language, statements on the floor of the House "
and Senate,"' as vell as the House Report," evidence congressional
intent to apply the Act retrospectively. Fourth, retrospective applica-
tion is required to prevent courts from being without federal law to
apply in cases commenced after repeal of the old law, involving liens
existing prior to repeal.' Because Congress was specific when it in-
community property in the bankruptcy estate regardless of state law. House Hear-
ings, supra note 14, app., at 163-64 (congressional staff comments). This provision
was changed to conform to current state laws on community property. National
Bankruptcy Conference, [Proposed] Bankruptcy Act of 1975, reprinted in House
Hearings, supra note 14, app., at 357, 358 n.2; see 11 U.S.C. § 541 (Supp. 11 1978).
Section 4-601(c), which terminated interests "such as dower and [curtesy]" upon the
filing of bankruptcy, House Hearings, supra note 14, app., at 165-66, and § 5-203(c),
which permitted the partition sale of an insolvent spouse's interests in jointly owned
property "regardless of consent or nonbankruptcy law," id. at 197 (congressional staff
comments), also raised concern as to their retrospective application. Section 4-601(c)
of the commission's bill has been dropped. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (Supp. 11 1978).
Section 5-203(c) has been modified to better reflect the interests of co-owners. See 11
U.S.C. § 363(f), (h) (Supp. 11 1978). In addition, important adequate protection pro-
visions benefitting certain secured creditors and co-owners were added. Id. §§ 361-
363.
51. House Report, supra note 3, at 462, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 6417-18.
52. Cf. United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam) (Congress presumed to act intentionally in choosing where to include lan-
guage); Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 1968) ("where
Congress has carefully employed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it
should not be implied where excluded"); Health Care Serv. Corp. v. Califano, 466
F. Supp. 1190, 1196 (N.D. Ill.) (similar), aff'd, 601 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1979).
53. 124 Cong. Rec. H11147, H11109 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep.
Edwards). Additional, but less extensive, remarks were made by Representative Ed-
wards on the date of the act's passage. 124 Cong. Rec. H11866 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards). Sections 402(a) and 403(a) were not mentioned at
that time. Representative Edwards spent more time than any other legislator on the
Bankruptcy Reform Act. Klee, supra note 41, at 941 n.6.
54. 124 Cong. Rec. S17425 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
55. House Report, supra note 3, at 287-88, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 6243-44. Although the Bankruptcy Reform Act wvas amended after the
House Report, see Klee, supra note 41, at 949-57, sections 402(a) and 403(a).re-
mained unchanged. Compare Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, §§
402(a), 403(a), 92 Stat. 2682-83 with H.R. 8200, §§ 402(a), 403(a), 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977), reprinted in App. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 602 (15th ed. L. King 1980)
(bill filed with house report).
56. E.g., Fisher v. Liberty Loan Corp., 6 Bankr. Rep. (West) 206, 211 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1980); Curry v. Associates Fin'l Servs., 5 Bankr. Rep. (West) 282, 28M-90
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980); Jackson v. Security Indus. Bank, 4 Bankr. Rep. (West)
293, 295 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980); Hoops v. Freedom Fin., 3 Bankr. Rep. (Vest) 635,
637 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980); Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 3 Bankr. Rep. (West)
629, 634-35 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
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tended to defer to state law, implying deference, when it is not ex-
press, would frustrate congressional intent.3 7 Finally, Congress in-
tended substantial reform of substantive and procedural bankruptcy
law, including how it relates to individual debtors.,9  This congres-
sional intent to reform would be partially frustrated by delaying the
Code's effectiveness as to liens created prior to enactment. Congres-
sional intent to apply section 522(f) retrospectively, however, raises
various constitutional issues concerning limits of the bankruptcy
power.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LINITXnONS
Section 522(f) was passed pursuant to congressional power "to
establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies through-
out the United States."0 This power extends to all "relations be-
tween [a] .. .debtor and his creditors,"61 is supreme over state law,"'
but is not absolute.w The breadth and supremacy of the bankruptcy
57. See note 52 supra and accompanying text. State law governs only the choice
of exemptions. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1978); see note 7 supra and accom-
panying text.
58. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 1-3, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 5787-89; House Report, supra note 3, at 3-5, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5965-66; 123 Cong. Rec. H11696-97 (daily ed. Oct. 27,
1977) (remarks of Rep. Rodino).
59. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
60. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
61. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513-14 (1938) (quoting In
re Reiman, 20 F. Cas. 490, 496-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 11,673)); accord, United
States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 47 (1938); Continental I1l. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Chicago, Rock Island & P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 672-73 (1935). See generally Regional
Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 153-54 (1974); Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses,
186 U.S. 181, 186 (1902). Congress' bankruptcy power has only been seriously ques-
tioned in one Supreme Court opinion. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improve-
ment Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 529-30 (1936) (municipal bankruptcy statute exceeds
bankruptcy power because it infringes on states' powers). But see United States v.
Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 49-52 (1938) (municipal bankruptcy statute upheld). The Court
has stated that the power is "incapable of final definition." Wright v. Union Cent.
Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513 (1938); see Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S.
102, 154 (1974).
62. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979); Perez v. Campbell, 402
U.S. 637, 649-56 (1971); Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 439 (1940); International
Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929); Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186
U.S. 181, 187-88 (1902); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 123-24
(1819); see Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (proper test of supremacy
clause is whether statute is "an obstacle" to congressional purpose).
63. Like other plenary powers of Congress, the bankruptcy power is subject to
the due process and "takings" clauses of the fifth amendment. Regional Rail Reorg.
Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 122-56 (1974); New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392,
489-95 (1970); Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 515-16 (1938);
Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 470 (1937);
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power, and section 522(f)'s clear relationship to that power, "b how-
ever, have prevented constitutional challenges to the section as pro-
spectively applied.6' Rather, cases weighing section 522(fYs constitu-
tionality have focused on liens created prior to the enactment and
effectiveness of the Code.6 Even the constitutional challenge to the
bankruptcy law based on retrospective application, however, is lim-
ited. No provision in the Constitution prohibits civil legislation that
interferes with a preexisting right or takes effect on a prior date.'
Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1937); Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 581, 589, 601-02 (1935); Continental I11. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 680-81 (1935).
Because of the broad definition of the power, see note 61 supra and accompanying
text, however, only two statutes have been held unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513,
530-32 (1936) (municipal bankruptcy statute); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02 (1935) (farmer mortgage redemption statute). Even
these holdings have been limited. See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 49-52
(1938) (municipal bankruptcy statute upheld); Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Moun-
tain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 470 (1937) (revised mortgage redemption statute up-
held). See also Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 400-01 & n.52 (1943) (Radford
and Mountain Trust compared as an example of when the Court has erred and
changed its position when confronted with similar legislation in a later case).
64. The purpose of § 522(f), fostering- the debtor's "fresh start," has long been
recognized as within the bankruptcy power. See, e.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, '292
U.S. 234, 244 (1934); note 11, 20 supra and accompanying text.
65. The only prospectively applied bankruptcy statute held unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court permitted state subdivisions to seek bankruptcy relief. Ashton v.
Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 531-32 (1936) ("an
invasion of the sovereignty of the States"). But see United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S.
27, 49-52 (1938) (voluntary reorganization in bankruptcy for state subdivisions up-
held). The constitutionality of a bankruptcy statute usually is challenged when con-
gressional action affects liens either through the retrospective application of new leg-
islation, the implementation of complex debt reorganization plans, or both. E.g.,
Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 108-17, 121-29 (1974) (reorganization
statute applied to pre-existing obligations); New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S.
392, 489-95 (1970) (railroad reorganization); Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Denver &
R.G.W.R., 328 U.S. 495, 509 (1946) (same); Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co.,
311 U.S. 273, 275-76, 278-79 (1940) (farmer mortgage redemption statute); Wright v.
Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513-14 (1938) (same); Adair v. Bank of Am.
Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 303 U.S. 350, 354-55 (1938) (same); Wright v. Vinton
Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 455-56 (1937) (same); Louisville
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1935) (same); Continental
Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 667-76
(1935) (newly enacted railroad reorganization statute).
66. See cases cited notes 30-31 supra.
67. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16 (1976); FHA v. Dar-
lington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 7-42, 788-89
(1948); Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 107 (1947); Carpenter v. Wabash Ry., 309
U.S. 23, 27-28 (1940); Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146 (1938); Norman v. Balti-
more & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 304-05 (1935); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 219
U.S. 467, 480-86 (1911); Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legisla-
tion, 51 Nw. U.L. Rev. 540, 540 (1956); Hochman, supra note 29, at 693-94; Smith
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The ex post facto clause6' applies to retroactive criminal penalties. 9
The contract clause7- expressly applies to the states.,' Only the fifth
amendment's limitations on the power of the federal government to
interfere with private property interests is applicable.7
I, supra note 29, at 229; Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights II, 6 Tcx. L.
Rev. 409, 409 (1928) (hereinafter cited as Smith II]; Stimson, Retroactive Application
of Law-A Problem in Constitutional Law, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 30, 30-33 (1939).
68. U.S. Const. art I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall
be passed.").
69. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96 (1952); Carpenter v. Penn-
sylvania, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 456, 462-63 (1855); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386,
390 (1798).
70. U.S. Const. art I, § 10, cl. 1.
71. Id. ("No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Con-
tracts."); see United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 101 S. Ct. 453, 458 (1980)
(elevated scrutiny used in contract clause case not applied in lieu of rational basis test
for federal economic regulation); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 82-83 (1978) (same); Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 107 (1947)
(if Congress were limited by the contract clause, contracts made in anticipation of
legislative action would "nullif[y]" the "paramount powers of Congress"); Kuchncr v.
Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1937) (contract clause not applicable to fed-
eral government); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589
(1935) (same); Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Chicago, Rock Island & P.
Ry. Co. 294 U.S. 648, 680 (1935) (same); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Witthuhn, 596
F.2d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 1979) (same); Norfolk, B. & C. Lines, Inc. v. Director, Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs, 539 F.2d 378, 381 (4th Cir. 1976) (same), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1078 (1977); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., 470 F.
Supp. 945, 956 (D. Mass. 1979) (same). Certain contractual obligations of the federal
government to private parties are protected property rights under the fifth amend-
ment. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353-54 (1935) (change in method of
bond payment by the government unconstitutional); Lynch v. United States, 292
U.S. 571, 577-79 (1934) (repeal of laws permitting renewal of war risk insurance
unconstitutional).
72. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,
69-70 (1978); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S, 1, 14-17 (1976); Re-
gional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 122-25 (1974); FHA v. Darlington, Inc.,
358 U.S. 84, 90-92 (1958); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 788 (1948); Flem-
ing v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 102-07 (1947); Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Moun-
tain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 470 (1937); Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S.
445, 452-56 (1937); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589
(1935); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934). Applying the fifth amend-
ment assumes that some infringement of rights has been caused by the government.
Because § 522(f) gives the power of avoidance to the debtor, it is arguable that this
regulation of the debtor-creditor relationship involves no government action. See
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978) (statute permitting private enforce-
ment of warehouseman's lien upheld against fourteenth amendment due process
challenge on grounds that there had been no state action). This assertion is not sup-
portable. In Flagg Bros., the Court distinguished the facts from other cases in which
state action had been found on the basis of "overt official involvement." Compare 436
U.S. at 157 ("total absence" of overt involvement) with North Ga. Finishing, Inc, v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975) (writ of garnishment issued by court clerk
without notice or hearing violative of due process); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
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The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be ... de-
prived of... property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. "'  The
Supreme Court, in analyzing deprivations by government, views the
due process and takings clauses as complementary. "' Although a pre-
cise formula "for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the
government" may not be possible, certain facts must be present to
render a deprivation unconstitutional. "  First, the claimant must
have a property interest that is compensable.--" Second, if the dep-
rivation is caused by a regulation, the claimant must show that the
80, 96-97 (1972) (seizure of assets by state officials xvithout notice or hearing violative
of due process); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 338, 341-42 (1969)
(garnishment summons issued by court clerk without notice or hearing violative of
due process). This distinction, which has been criticized as too narrow an application
of the state action requirement, see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 107
(Supp. 1979) ("distinction ... (is] wholly arbitrary"); Note, Creditors' Remedies as
State Action, 89 Yale L.J. 538, 553-60 (1980), is not applicable to the issue here.
Section 522(f) permits avoidance to the extent that a lien "impairs an exemption to
which the debtor would have been entitled" without the encumbrance. See note 7
supra. To claim an exemption, however, the debtor must file with the bankruptcy
court, while a "party in interest" may object. 11 U.S.C. § 522(1 (Supp. 11 1978).
Once exempted, property is protected from claims pre-dating the case except as
specifically provided in the Code. Id. § 522(c). Thus, judicial involvement with §
522(f) avoidance is even more extensive than that evident in North Georgia
Finishing, Fuentes, and Sniadach.
73. U.S. Const. amend. V. The analysis used to determine whether a taking is
permissible under the fifth amendment is similar to that of whether a taking is per-
missible under state police power. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 43S
U.S. 104, 122 (1978); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. -26, 23S-39 (1897);
see Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (follows Penn Central, which involved
an alleged state taking, to uphold a deprivation by the federal government).
74. Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102. 155-56 (1974); Moore v. City
of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 514 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). Compare Louis-
ville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02 (1935) (holding statute
unconstitutional under the just compensation clause) with Wright v. Vinton Branch
of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 446 (1937) (describing Radford as based
on the due process clause). The connection may be explained by the requirement of
just compensation. If a public "taking" is found to have occurred, then a means to
compensate the owner must be provided as a matter of procedural due process.
Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 156 (1974).
75. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 100 S. Ct. 2138, 2141 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.
51, 65 (1979).
76. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 101 S. Ct. 453, 458 (19s0);
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 101 S. Ct. 446, 450 (1980); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-80 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S.
372, 375-76 (1946).
77. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-27 (1978).
Compare United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1946) (property infringed
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regulation is invalid or that the impact on the property is severe.
Third, if a taking"9 is found, the claimant must also show that the
property is not put to a public use ° or that a means is not provided
for compensation" Under due process analysis, the claimant must
show that the statute does not have a legitimate purpose and that the
means chosen to effect that purpose are arbitrary or irrational.2
A. Unjust Takings
1. Compensable Property
To challenge a government action as an unjust taking of private
property, a claimant must show that the property interest is com-
pensable and, thus, protected from takings within the meaning of the
fifth amendment.' Most liens are protected, including real property
mortgages,' railroad bonds,8 statutory liens to protect a landlord's
by government's use of claimant's air space held to be a taking) with Andrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64-68 (1979) (regulation of artifacts made from protected birds
held not to be a taking).
78. E.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 100 S. Ct. 2138, 2141 (1980); Andrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 127, 138 (1978).
79. "Taking" is used to indicate that an impairment by the government of pro-
tected property rights has been so severe that the constitution requires compensation
for the impairment. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978); Regional Rail Rcorg. Act
Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 117-18 (1974). As opposed to "taking," which is a conclusive
legal term, deprivation refers to the factual question of impairment or diminution of
a property interest.
80. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954); United States ex rel. TVA
v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 551-52 (1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945).
81. See Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 155 (1974); Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48-49 (1960); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Rad-
ford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02 (1935).
82. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1976); see Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 82-92, 94 & n.39
(1978). Equal protection analysis "largely track(s] and duplicate[s]" due process analy-
sis if no other substantive rights are involved. Id. at 93; see United States R.R.
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 101 S. Ct. 453, 458-60 (1980) (classifications in economic
regulations not violative of equal protection unless arbitrary or irrational). Except for
the means to compensate a taking, procedural due process issues are beyond the
scope of this Note.
83. See note 76 supra.
84. See Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273, 278 (1940) (Union
Central II); Borchard v. California Bank, 310 U.S. 311, 317 (1940); John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bartels, 308 U.S. 180, 186-187 (1939); Wright v. Union Cent.
Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 517 (1938) (Union Central [); Wright v. Vinton Branch
of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 470 (1937); Louisville Joint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02 (1935).
85. See Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 121-24, 148-56 (1974);
New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 489-93 (1970); Reconstruction Fin. Corp.
v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R, 328 U.S. 495, 533 (1946).
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claim for rentj and a subcontractor's claim for labor and materials."
Congress also has conceded that protection extends to judicial liens
and other non-exempt security interests.
Although every general type of lien may be protected," this consti-
tutional protection only applies to certain rights attached to the
lien. 9° Whether these rights include the use of liens to compel re-
payment by threatening repossession of an asset of low current value,
but relatively high replacement cost, is significant when evaluating
the constitutional impact of section 522(f)."1 In Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Radford," the Supreme Court reasoned that rights
under state law permitting a mortgagee to retain a lien until full re-
payment warranted protection under the takings clause." Although
this language may have been dicta,' it was apparent that the Court
86. Miles Corp. v. Lindel, 107 F.2d 729, 731 (8th Cir. 1939), Ginsberg v. Lin-
del, 107 F.2d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 1939).
87. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 46-48 (1960).
88. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2) (Supp. 11 1978); see Senate Report, supra note 3, at 76,
reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5862; House Report, supra note
3, at 361, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6317. Congress also
acknowledged constitutional protection of liens in deciding to include adequate pro-
tection provisions for certain interests. 11 U.S.C. §§ 361-364 (Supp. I 1978); see
Senate Report, supra note 3, at 49, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 5835; House Report, supra note 3, at 339, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 6295.
89. Liens created by consent or statute and encumbering realty or personalty
have been afforded constitutional protection. See notes 84-87 supra and accompany-
ing text.
90. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 590-95
(1935).
91. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
92. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
93. The statute at issue in Radford, the Frazier-Lempke Act, permitted farmers
to redeem mortgages at the appraised value of the property. Fra,ier-Lempke Act,
ch. 869, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934). The Court found that the statute deprived the mort-
gagee of five property rights: (1)'[t]he right to retain the lien until the indebtedness
thereby secured is paid"; (2)"[t]he right to realize upon the security by a judicial
public sale"; (3)"[t]he right to determine [the time of] such sale .... subject only to
the discretion of the court"; (4)"[t]he right to protect its interest in the property by
bidding at such sale . . . .to assure having the mortgaged property devoted primar-
fly to the satisfaction of the debt, either through the receipt of the proceeds of a fair
competitive sale or by taking the property itself"; and (5) "(t]he right to control ...
the property during ... default." 295 U.S. at 594-95.
94. Radford may be supportable solely on the basis of a deprivation of the col-
lateral's resale value, rather than on the more expansive reading of creditors' consti-
tutionally protected rights. Under the first of two alternatives provided by the Act,
the farmer could, with the creditor's consent, buy back the mortgage at a price based
on current value, but with payment of eighty-five percent of the price deferred for
six years at the miniscule interest rate of one percent. Frazier-Lempke Act, ch. 869,
§ s(3), 48 Stat. 1289 (1934). The Court concluded that this provision effectively re-
quired conveyance at "less than the appraised value." 295 U.S. at 591-92. Alterna-
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intended a secured creditor to have a constitutional right to choose to
liquidate the collateral or to hold the lien as a means to compel full
repayment of the face amount of the obligation, even when the value
of the collateral was less than that of the loan secured." This reason-
ing, however, is problematic because the creditor would have an un-
qualified right to retain the lien until full repayment of the underlying in-
debtedness. Consequently, the creditor could veto any effort by Con-
gress to rehabilitate the debtor in bankruptcy by decreasing a
debtor's indebtedness, and permitting the debtor to retain certain
assets to regain financial self-sufficiency and productivity.6
Apparently recognizing this policy consideration, the Court now
will protect only the lienor's right to the value of the encumbered
asset. For example, a mortgage claim is not compensable property if
its repossession value to the claimant is negligible. 7 A debtor re-
habilitation statute that permits the secured creditor to demand the
resale value of the property, similar to the one invalidated in
Radford," and railroad reorganizations in which secured creditors re-
tively, without the creditor's consent, the farmer could stay foreclosure for up to five
years with the continuing option to purchase at current value. Frazier-Lempke Act,
ch. 869, § s(7), 48 Stat. 1289 (1934). This five year stay could permit the debtor to
unfairly exploit fluctuations in value after his default to the creditor's disadvantage.
295 U.S. at 592-93, 596-97. Under both alternatives, the creditor is deprived of value
in the property securing the loan. In addition to its use of excessive language in its
holding, the Court has since described its decision in Radford as an "error." Helver-
ing v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 400-01 & n.52 (1943).
95. The rights listed by the Court, see note 93 supra, protected the face value of
the mortgagee's claim and the resale value of the encumbered property. See Note,
Constitutional Limitations on the Bankruptcy Power: Chapter XII Real Property
Arrangements, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 362, 384-85 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Constitu-
tional Limitations].
96. "While the rights of the bondholders are entitled to respect, they do not
command Procrustean measures. They certainly do not dictate that rail operations
vital to the Nation be jettisoned despite the availability of a feasible alternative. The
public interest is not merely a pawn to be sacrificed for the strategic purposes or
protection of a class of security holders .... " Penn-Central Merger & N. & W.
Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 510-11 (1968); see Constitutional Limitations, supra
note 95, at 387.
97. In re 620 Church St. Bldg. Corp., 299 U.S. 24, 27 (1936). Claimants held
$67,250 in junior mortgages on the bankrupt debtor's principal asset, a building. ld.
at 26. The building was encumbered by a first mortgage of $445,500 and had an
appraised value of only $245,025. Id. Thus, the claimants had no interest in the
property's resale value.
98. "Safeguards were provided [in the statute] to protect the rights of secured
creditors . . . to the extent of the value of the property .... There is no constitu-
tional claim of the creditor to more than that." Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co.,
311 U.S. 273, 278 (1940) (Union Central II) (citations omitted); see Borchard v. Cali-
fornia Bank, 310 U.S. 311, 317 (1940); John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bartels,
308 U.S. 180, 186-87 (1939); Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 517
(1938) (Union Central I); Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300
U.S. 440, 470 (1937).
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ceive the resale value of their collateral," do not interfere with value
protected by the fifth amendment. Thus, a lien is constitutionally
protected only to the extent that resale of the encumbered asset can
cover the creditor's claim and not to the extent that its retention may
be used to compel repayment.' °
If the property encumbered has no value as a source of repayment,
section 522(f) liens are not constitutionally protected property
interests.11 Often, the property rights encumbered by section 522(f)
liens have a high coercive, but only nominal resale, value and are
rarely repossessed."2 On occasion, foreclosing creditors have even
discarded the assets." Interests avoidable under section 522(f)(2) ex-
clude purchase money, possessory security interests, and encum-
brances on certain personal assets."°  Thus, section 522(f)(2) affects
only marginally compensable property. Because judicial liens avoid-
able under section 522(f)(1) encumber a wider range of assets,"
however, they will more frequently have value as a source of repay-
ment. Accordingly, the factual determination of value, and whether
the lienor's interest is compensable, depends on the specific property
encumbered by the specific lien.
2. Economic Impact and Purpose
If a lien is compensable, the extent of the "economic impact" on
the property and the purpose of the deprivation become relevant to
whether interference with its use constitutes a taking.' '  "Economic
impact" analysis focuses on whether the statute or regulation unduly
deprives the owner of existing or future uses of the property., "  Se-
99. Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 156 (1974) (reorganization
complies with fifth amendment requirements "'[a]s long as creditors are assured fair
value, with interest, for their properties"); New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S.
392, 489-90 (1970) (similar reasoning).
100. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Becki vth, 101 S. Ct. 446, 450 (19SM0
("a mere unilateral expectation or an abstract need is not a property interest entitled
to protection").
101. See notes 97-100 supra and accompanying text.
102. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
103. See Curry v. Associates Fin. Servs.. 5 Bankr. Rep. (West) 282. 290 tBankr.
N.D. Ohio 1980).
104. See notes 1, 7 supra.
105. Section 522(f)(1), unlike § 522(f)(2), is not limited by the type of exempt
assets subject to avoidance. A debtor could even avoid a lien on his residence up to
the amount of his exemption. See Lucero v. Security Indus. Bank, 4 Bankr. Rep.
(West) 659, 660-61 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
106. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-28 (1978).
The Court has described Penn Central as its 'most recent exposition on the Takings
Clause." Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
107. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127-28 (1978)
(landmark preservation law upheld), see Agins v. City of Tiburon, 100 S. Ct. 213S.
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vere economic impact to property may be warranted by and is
weighed against the purpose of and need for the deprivation." The
major limitation on permissible economic impact by the government
is that the owner must retain some "beneficial" and "reasonable use"
in the property."0 When an owner is permitted to retain possession,
statutes causing even severe impairments to the property's usefulness
have been upheld."' Without some remaining reasonable use,
however, the economic impact, alone, may constitute a taking.
A reasonable beneficial use of a lien after avoidance under section
522(f) will often exist as a matter of fact."' First, if the assets are
worth more than the exemption amount, the lien retains a reasonable
beneficial use and the creditor can recover the excess."' Second, if
the lien covers assets other than those exempted, the creditor can
still repossess the non-exempt assets."' Third, even liens covering
only exempt assets worth less than the exemption amount had a
reasonable remaining use that has since been lost through no act of
the government. The Code became effective eleven months after
enactment 114 and was not applied to pending cases."' The reasonable
2141 (1980) (zoning ordinance upheld); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)
(prohibiting sale of artifacts upheld).
108. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-67 (1979) (prohibition of sale of
artifacts made from eagles); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S.
155, 166-69 (1958) (forced closing of gold mines to make workers and equipment
available for war effort); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (forced cutting
of red cedar trees to protect nearby orchards). But see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (prohibition of mining under residential property
despite specific reservation of mineral and mining rights in deed conveying surface to
homeowners held unconstitutional).
109. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 100 S. Ct. 2138, 2142 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1977). An express limitation on the degree
of economic impact is that the owner retain the right to exclude others from the
physical invasion of property. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-180
(1979). Although the right to exclude others may be the very essence of possessing
land, the creditor's right to collateral under nonpossessory liens is hardly exclusive.
being subject to rights of the debtor and, depending on priorities, other creditors.
Section 522(f)(2) only permits the avoidance of nonpossessory liens. 11 U.S.C. §
522(P(2) (Supp. II 1976).
110. See note 108 supra.
111. See Penn Cent Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 136-38
(1978).
112. See Jordan v. Borda, 5 Bankr. Rep. (West) 59, 61 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980).
113. Not all liens are subject to avoidance. See, e.g., Moore v. Household Fin.
Corp., 5 Bankr. Rep. (West) 669, 670 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980); Credithrift of Am.
Inc. v. Meyers, 2 Bankr. Rep. (West) 603, 605-06 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1980); Abt v.
Household Fin. Co., 2 Bankr. Rep. (West) 323, 325-26 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980); notes
1, 7, 14 supra.
114. The Act was enacted on November 6, 1978. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. It took effect on October 1, 1979, Id. § 402(a), 92
Stat. 2682 (1978).
115. Id. § 403(a), 92 Stat. 2683 (1978).
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use surviving the government's act was the eleven month period dur-
ing which the creditor could have developed alternate means of pro-
tecting the interest secured by the lien.,"
Even if avoidance under section 522(f) leaves no reasonable re-
maining use, the requirement can be criticized as an inappropriate
legal standard. If the economic impact is outweighed by the public
purpose when mine operations have been closed," a forest cut
down,"' and the pursuit of one's livelihood prevented,"' a similar re-
sult would seem appropriate when a creditor is deprived of a lien
encumbering an asset that has only nominal value.'" That the
reasonable remaining use standard depends largely on the definition
of the property right 21 and has been used primarily to uphold dep-
rivations by government,1' perhaps demonstrates that a result, not a
standard, is sought. Distinctions based on whether the deprivation is
complete are strained and arbitrary. The defects of the test are ap-
parent when it affords greater constitutional protection to liens of
nominal value than property interests worth several hundred
thousand dollars.2'
Provided the economic impact is not too severe, the benefit to the
public generated by a deprivation will outweigh its economic impact
116. For example, a judgment lienor could have enforced the lien prior to the
Code's effective date or obtained a judicial lien on a non-exempt asset. In mail)
cases, the holder of a security interest could also have taken action. If default pre-
ceded the effective date, the creditor could have repossessed the asset. U.C.C. §
9-503. Moreover, if a debtor attempted to postpone bankruptcy until the Code be-
came effective, the creditor could commence an involuntary proceeding under the
old bankruptcy law. See 11 U.S.C. § 22(b) (1976) (replaced with 11 U.S.C. § 303
(Supp. II 1978)). Finally, creditors could have required new collateral for any loan
renewals and negotiated for new collateral in the ease of loans maturing after the
effective date. The prudent lienor would have obtained new liens more than three
months before the effective date to preclude preference avoidance under the Code,
see 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (Supp. I 1978), and would have retained the original
lien in the event of such avoidance under the old Act. See 11 U.S.C. § 96 t1976)
(replaced with 11 U.S.C. § 547 (Supp. I 1978)).
117. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962), United States
v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958).
118. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 278-80 (1928).
119. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64-68 (1979); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,
658-59 (1887).
120. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
121. In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), the deprivation of tile
right to exclude others from land was held to leave the owner with no remaining
reasonable use of his property. By narrowly defining the protected property right as
the right to exclude, the Court made it impossible for the government to successfully
argue that other remaining uses existed. Id. at 179-80.
122. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 100 S. Ct. 2138, 2142 (1980), Andrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-68 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 43S
U.S. 104, 131, 135-38 (1978).
123. For example, the Court has upheld a decrease in property value from
S800,000 to S60,000. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915). Liens sub-
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when the deprivation is caused by valid regulatory measures.' Un-
like takings found despite the clear presence of a public need," 5 the
purpose of section 522(f) is not to appropriate private property for an
enterprise unique to government. Rather, the section places the gov-
ernment as a "mediator in the process of competition among" private
interests."l Under takings analysis, courts will not "effectively com-
pel the government to regulate by purchase." iz
Not all government regulation, however, is permissible. Regula-
tions prohibiting uses of property must substantially relate to a legiti-
mate public purpose, or the general welfare.Iz Section 522(f) easily
withstands this analysis. Congressional efforts to protect the ex-
empted property of individual debtors under section 522(f) are well
within the bankruptcy power to legislate debtor relief."z  Given the
Court's deference to the bankruptcy power, the significance of indi-
vidual bankruptcies to the enactment of the Code, and the role of
exemptions in the Code, the section serves at least a legitimate, and
ject to avoidance under section 522(f) are usually of nominal compensable value. See
notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
124. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 127-28
(1978).
125. E.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 89-90 (1962); Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 46-48 (1960); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,
263-65 (1946); Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327,
329-30 (1922).
126. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36, 62 (1964).
127. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (emphasis deleted).
128. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 100 S. Ct. 2138, 2141 (1980) (land use regulation
upheld); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (land-
mark preservation law upheld); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 513-14
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (law limiting co-habitation overruled); Nectow v. City
of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) (inflexible application of zoning ordinance
arbitrary and unconstitutional); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,
395 (1926) (zoning ordinance upheld); see Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64-68 (1979)
(control of sale of eagle artifacts upheld); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590, 594-95 (1962) (closing mine to protect neighboring residential owners).
129. See Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273, 278 (1940) (Union
Central II); notes 11, 61 supra and accompanying text. In light of congressional find-
ings that liens subject to avoidance under § 522(0 often arise from contracts of adhe-
sion and serve to frustrate the debtor's fresh start, it could be argued that these
property interests are nuisances subject to prohibition by legislative act. See Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 144-46 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Efforts to characterize cases upholding property deprivations as valid
preventions of nuisances have been criticized on the grounds that, without wrong-
doing, imposing the label "nuisance" is merely an excuse to favor one property use
over another. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of 'Just Compensation' Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1196-99 (1967);
Sax, supra note 126, at 49-50. Liens subject to § 522(f), however, often do arise from
the wrongful conduct of creditors. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
Thus, this argument supports a finding that Congress' purpose outweighs the harm to
private property interests.
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probably an important,"3 purpose. Thus, the section does not take; it
validly regulates.
Even if the usual effect of a statute is not to cause a taking, how-
ever, its application to a particular claimant may still cause a suffi-
ciently severe economic impact that a taking will be found."t ' This
requires a consideration of the constitutional consequences of such a
finding.
3. Valid Takings
Private property may not be taken except for a public use and
adequate compensation. Public use has been defined expansively.Iu
Exercises of the bankruptcy power have not been questioned on the
grounds of public use, even if a taking, or the likelihood of a taking,
has been found.'33 Further, protecting the debtor's fresh start assists
the debtor's dependents and, ultimately, society by enabling the
debtor to be self-supporting and productive.13' Therefore, property
taken by retrospective application of section 522(f) is applied to a
public use vithin the meaning of the fifth amendment.
130. In recent contract clause cases, the Supreme Court has used elevated stan-
dards of review to determine if the impairment of contractual rights by exercises of
the state police power are permissible. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 43S
U.S. 234, 245 (1978) ("The severity of the impairment" of a contract "measures the
height of the hurdle of the state legislature must clear."). When the impairment has
been severe, the Court has required the statute to be "reasonable and necessary to
serve... important purposes." United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey. 431 U.S. 1,
29 (1977) (state abrogation of own liability unconstitutional). Although inappropriate
in due process and equal protection challenges to federal regulation of private eco-
nomic interests, see note 71 supra, the Court might demand more than a substantial
relationship between statutory means and purpose before finding a deprivation not to
be a taking. The debtor's fresh start is clearly an important purpose within Congress'
bankruptcy power. See notes 11, 61 supra. The retrospective application of section
522(f) is reasonable. See notes 159-69 infra and accompanying text. Having a few
assets after bankruptcy certainly seems necessary to allow the debtor to start afresh.
not only because creditors have used liens on such assets in a coercive manner, see
notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text, but because they would provide tie
debtor with a modest base to use in his own financial rehabilitation.
131. A takings analysis not only considers the general effect of the challenged stat-
ute, but burdens on the particular claimant as well. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. \alhon, 260 U.S. 393,
413 (1922).
132. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34 (1954); TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546,
551-52 (1946); American Dredging Co. v. Dutchyshyn, 480 F. Supp. 957, 961-62
(E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 614 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1979).
133. See Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 124-2.95 (1974); cf. Louis-
ville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02 (1935) (act found un-
constitutional for lack of compensation, not lack of public use).
134. House Report, supra note 3, at 116, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 6076-77; Donnelly, The New (Proposed?) Bankruptcy Act: The Develop-
ment of its Structural Provisions and their Impact on the Interests of Consumer-
Debtors, 18 Santa Clara L. Rev. 291, 329-30 (1978).
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A taking of property for a public use also must be adequately com-
pensated. Nothing in the Code provides compensation for liens
avoided under section 522(f).'- The Tucker Act, 3 ' however, gives
the Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear claims "founded . .. upon
the Constitution," and can afford adequate compensation. 117
Although it only grants jurisdiction and creates no substantive right,"
the Tucker Act gives the means to enforce the government's implied
promise under the fifth amendment to compensate a public taking.',
It provides a legal remedy of money damages; "[s]tatutory recogni-
tion" of the particular claim is not necessary.110 The Tucker Act has
been held to provide the means for adequate compensation of a rail-
road debt reorganization statute,14' a limitation on liability for nuclear
reactor accidents,"4 and the revocation of a dredging permit by the
Army Corps of Engineers."
The proper inquiry to determine if the Tucker Act is applicable to
takings resulting from section 522(f) is whether Congress intended to
withdraw suits based on the Code from the Tucker Act's
protection.'14  Because the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 does not
135. No case holding the retrospective application of § 522(f) to be unconstitu-
tional has found the Code to provide compensation or has addressed the Tucker Act
question. See cases cited notes 30-31 supra. One court has observed, however, with-
out citing support, that the avoidance provision deprives lienors of their property for
a private purpose. Hoops v. Freedom Fin., 3 Bankr. Rep. (West) 635, 636 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1980).
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. II 1978).
137. Id.; see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,
94 n.39 (1978) (alternative holding); Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102,
125-26 (1974); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 15-17 (1933); American Dredg-
ing Co. v. Dutchyshyn. 480 F. Supp. 957, 961-62 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 614 F.2d 769
(3d Cir. 1979). District courts may also hear claims against the United States for
amounts up to $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
138. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976).
139. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933).
140. Id.
141. Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 136, 148-56 (1974).
142. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 94 n.39
(1978) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976)).
143. American Dredging Co. v. Dutchyshyn, 480 F. Supp. 957, 961, 962 (E.D.
Pa.), aff'd, 614 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1979).
144. Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 125-26 (1974); see Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 94 n.39 (1978). This approach
is justified by several rules of construction. The repeal of a statute should not be
implied. Amell v. United States, 384 U.S. 158, 165-66 (1966); United States v. Bor-
den Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1939); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 586
(1934). Accordingly, when one statute does not expressly repeal another, it is pre-
sumed that the two are intended to co-exist. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551
(1974). In addition, it is presumed that statutes are intended to conform with the
Constitution. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548, 571 (1973); United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944). Thus,
when the Tucker Act may.serve to compensate a taking caused by another statute,
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expressly repeal the Tucker Act, the legislative history must be
probed.' Although certain provisions of the Code"' were designed
to provide constitutional protection to lienors, lr the House and Sen-
ate reports'4 do not preclude application of the Tucker Act. Despite
numerous amendments to other statutes, no amendment was made of
the Tucker Act.19  Thus, the Tucker Act should be applied to com-
pensate takings arising under section 522(f).
B. Substantive Due Process
If section 522(f) liens withstand takings analysis, the substantive
requirements of the due process clause must still be met. In Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,"° the Court articulated the standard of
due process review for retrospective federal statutues."' Assuming
the legislative act is within the enacting body's legitimate power,"
the challenging party must show that the act, and its retrospective
application, are arbitrary and irrational." The Court reasoned that
retrospective application was justified if the burdened parties had
benefitted from the now remedied problem, without unfair disadvan-
tage because of their reliance on prior law.1' No unfair disadvantage
is present if the burdened parties would not have behaved differently
had they possessed knowledge of the statute or the social problem
remedied."i Lower courts have also weighed the relative equities
the presumption is that it should apply unless congressional intent to the contrary is
evident.
145. Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 129, 135-36 (1974).
146. 11 U.S.C. §§ 361-364 (Supp. 11 1978).
147. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 49-58, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 5835-44; House Report, supra note 3, at 175, 338-46, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6136, 6294-303.
148. See reports cited note 147 supra.
149. See Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IH, 92 Stat. 2673 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of U.S.C. (Supp. I 1978)).
150. 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
151. Id. at 15-17.
152. Id. at 15.
153. Id. at 15-17; see Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 592 F.2d
947, 960 (7th Cir. 1979); Adams Nursing Home, Inc. v. Mathews, 548 F.2d 1077,
1080 (1st Cir. 1977).
154. 428 U.S. at 17.
155. Id. Despite this language, reliance on existing law rarely has been used to
determine if a statute is violative of due process. E.g., Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S.
100, 106-07 (1947); Carpenter v. Wabash Ry., 309 U.S. 23, 26-27 (1940); Louisville &
N.R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 474-75 (1911); see Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
294 U.S. 240, 304-06 (1935). But see Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938)
(reliance on existing law considered). The Court's deference to the reliance of parties
on prior law has been criticized. Note, Constitutionality of Retroactive Land
Statutes-Indiana's Model Dormant Mineral Act, 12 Ind. L. Rev. 455, 485 (1979).
But see Brown, Vested Rights and the Portal-to-Portal Act, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 723.
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among affected parties, 5 provisions limiting the burden,'!' and the
degree of prior regulation."
Section 522(f) does not violate due process under this analysis. The
creditor affected by section 522(f) previously benefitted from the
coercive use of liens covered "3 and has not been unfairly disadvan-
taged. The breadth of the contractual provisions imposed on the
debtor, 160 the nominal resale value of the assets,'6' and the limitations
on voiding security interests 162 support the conclusion that creditors
would not have behaved differently with knowledge of section 522(f).
Because creditors' conduct is the source of the problem addressed in
the legislation, prior knowledge of the problem remedied probably
existed and certainly would not have led to different practices."
Creditors had numerous opportunities to learn of section 522() before
effectiveness. Congress delayed the Code's effective date for eleven
months; 164 consumer finance interests participated in legislative
hearings; t and the Code was not applicable to cases filed before the
effective date. ' Moreover, the equities clearly weigh in the debtor's
favor, 167 the avoidance powers are limited,' 6"  and Congress has long
746-47 (1948) (parties' expectations based on prior law relevant); Hochman, supra
note 29, at 696 (same); Smith II, supra note 67, at 427 (same); Stimson, supra note
67, at 37-38 (same).
156. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 592 F.2d 947, 960 (7th Cir.
1979).
157. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 592 F.2d 947, 960-61 (7th
Cir. 1979); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., 470 F. Supp. 945, 958 (D.
Mass. 1979).
158. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 592 F.2d 947, 960 (7th Cir.
1979); Adams Nursing Home, Inc. v. Mathews, 548 F.2d 1077, 1081 (1st Cir. 1977).
159. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text. In Turner Elkhorn, the statute
burdened only coal mine operators whose employees had been harmed by the health
hazard it sought to remedy. 428 U.S. at 18. Imposing a burden on all coal mining
companies as a class had been posited as a more equitable manner of retrospective
application. Id. Because retrospective application was only required to be rational,
the Court did not find the distinction to be significant to its constitutional analysis.
Id. at 18-19. Thus, in the rare case in which a lienor has not used liens to coerce
debtors, the imposition of the burden on this party as a member of a class would still
be rational.
160. See note 15 supra.
161. Id.
162. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
163. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1976).
164. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-593, § 402(a), 92 Stat. 2682.
165. See House Hearings, supra note 14, at 1359 (statement of National Consumer
Finance Association); 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 44, at 124 (statement of Wal-
ter Vaughn).
166. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 403(a) 92 Stat. 2683.
167. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
168. The debtor may only avoid liens to the extent they interfere with an exemp-
tion. 11 U.SC. § 522(f) (Supp. 11 1978).
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regulated bankruptcy relationships.' Consequently, a substantive
due process challenge to section 522(f) is unlikely to succeed.
CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy law strikes a balance between the competing interests
of creditors and debtors. When the debtor defaults, creditors cer-
tainly deserve a fair distribution of assets and protection of their property
interests. Yet, to have meaning, bankruptcy law must shelter the
debtor from lingering claims and afford at least some means to regain
financial self-sufficiency. Thus, section 522(f) should be upheld in
order to save the debtor from destitution, regardless of when his
obligations arose.
Joseph C. Hutcheson, II
169. Congress enacted its first bankruptcy statute in 1800. Act of Apr. 6, 1800, ch.
19, 2 Stat. 19 (1800) (repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, cli. 6, 2 Stat. 248 (1803)).
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, liens in general were subject to extensive regula-
tion. See Bankruptcy Act, §§ 67(a)-(c) (formerly codified at 11 U.S.C. § 107(ac)-(
(1976) (replaced by 11 U.S.C. §§ 349(b), 547(b), (d), 551 (Supp. 11 1978))).
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